♠AO 245B(05-MA)

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 1 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

## District of Massachusetts

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

V.

TAREK MEHANNA

Case Number: 1: 09 CR 10017 - 001 - GAO

USM Number: 27152-038 J.W. CARNEY, ESQUIRE

	Defendant's Attorney	✓ Additio	nal documents attached
Correction of Sent THE DEFENDAN pleaded guilty to cou			
pleaded nolo contend which was accepted			
was found guilty on after a plea of not gu			
The defendant is adjudi-	cated guilty of these offenses:  Additi	onal Counts - See cor	ntinuation page 📝
Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	<b>Count</b>
8 USC Sec. 2339B	Conspiracy to Provide Material Support or Resources to a Designated	06/17/10	1ss
8 USC Sec. 2339A	Foreign Terrorist Group.  Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists.	06/17/10	2ss
8 USC Sec. 2339A	Providing and Attempting to Provide Material Support to Terrorists.	02/28/07	3ss
8 USC Sec. 956	Conspiracy to Kill in a Foreign Country	06/17/10	4ss
The defendant is the Sentencing Reform		ent. The sentence is i	mposed pursuant to
The defendant has be	een found not guilty on count(s)		
Count(s)	is are dismissed on the motion of	of the United States.	
or mailing address until.	at the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district with all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgme fy the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic c	ent are fully paid. If or	nge of name, residence, dered to pay restitution,
	04/12/12		
	Date of Imposition of Jyogment		
	/Sey	1 Cover	
	Signature of Judge		
	The Hoporable Geor	ge A. O'Toole	
	Judge/U.S. District (	Court	
	Name and Title of Judge		
	Cepvil	13 2012	
	Date		

**№**AO 245B(05-MA)

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 1A - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DEFENDANT: TAREK MEHANNA

CASE NUMBER: 1: 09 CR 10017 - 001 - GAO

## ADDITIONAL COUNTS OF CONVICTION

Judgment—Page \_\_\_\_2 of \_\_

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	<b>Count</b>
18 USC Sec 371	Conspiracy	06/17/10	5ss
18 USC Sec. 1001	Making False Statements	12/16/06	6ss
(a)(2)			
18 USC Sec. 1001	Making False Statements	12/16/06	7ss
(a)(2)			

C	Case 1:09-cr-10017-GAO	Document 432	Filed 04/13/12	Page 3 of 23	
<b>S</b> AO 245B(05-MA)	(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal C Sheet 2 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05	Case			
DEFENDANT: CASE NUMBE	TAREK MEHANNA R: 1: 09 CR 10017 - 001	- GAO	•	Judgment — Page3 of	10
		IMPRISONM	ENT		
The defend total term of:	dant is hereby committed to the cus 210 month(s)	tody of the United State	es Bureau of Prisons to	be imprisoned for a	
	on count 4ss, 180 months on e risonment to be served concur		ss, 60 months on 6	each of counts 5ss-7ss. A	11
The court	makes the following recommendation	ons to the Bureau of Pri	isons:		
The defender at as no as no as no as no as no	dant is remanded to the custody of the dant shall surrender to the United States Marshall dant shall surrender for service of some 2 p.m. on	tates Marshal for this di m.	strict:  1 designated by the Bu	reau of Prisons:	
Defendant	delivered on		to		

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By \_\_\_\_\_\_ DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

, with a certified copy of this judgment.

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on the attached page.

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DE	FENDANT:	TAREK MEHANN	J <b>A</b>	<del>-</del>	Judgment—P	age 4	of _	10
CA	SE NUMBER:	1: 09 CR 10017	- 001 - GAO					
			SUPERVISE	D RELEASE		See cont	tinuation	page
Upo	on release from in	nprisonment, the defendar	nt shall be on supervised	release for a term of:	7 у	ear(s)		
on	each of counts	s 1ss-7ss, to run conce	urrently with each of	ther.				
cust	The defendant r ody of the Burea	nust report to the probation of Prisons.	on office in the district to	which the defendant is	released withir	172 hours of r	elease f	rom the
The	defendant shall r	not commit another federa	al, state or local crime.					
The subs ther	defendant shall r stance. The defer eafter, not to exce	not unlawfully possess a condant shall submit to one of eed 104 tests per year, as	controlled substance. The drug test within 15 days s directed by the probation	e defendant shall refrair of release from impriso on officer.	n from any unlay nment and at lea	wful use of a c ast two periodi	ontrolle c drug t	d ests
V		testing condition is suspe abuse. (Check, if applic		t's determination that th	e defendant pos	es a low risk o	of	
✓	The defendant s	shall not possess a firearm	, ammunition, destructiv	ve device, or any other d	langerous weapo	on. (Check, if	applical	ble.)
$\checkmark$	The defendant s	shall cooperate in the colle	ection of DNA as directe	ed by the probation offic	er. (Check, if a	pplicable.)		
		shall register with the state eted by the probation office			here the defenda	int resides, wo	rks, or i	s a
	The defendant s	shall participate in an appr	roved program for dome	stic violence. (Check, i	f applicable.)			
Sch	If this judgment edule of Payment	imposes a fine or restitut s sheet of this judgment.	tion, it is a condition of s	supervised release that the	he defendant pay	y in accordanc	e with th	he
	The defendant n	nust comply with the stan	dard conditions that hav	e been adopted by this c	ourt as well as v	with any additi	onal cor	nditions

### STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- 3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and
- as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

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		Sheet 5 - D. Massachi	usetts - 10/05									
DEF	ENDANT:	TAREK ME 1: 09 CR 10		CAO			Judgment — 1	Page	5	of _	10	
CAS	SE NUMBER	1. 09 CK 10			FTADV 1	PENALTIE	· <b>C</b>					
	The defendant	must pay the total	criminal monetary	penalties u	nder the sch	edule of paymer	nts on Shee	t 6.				
		Assessment		F	ine		Rest	itution				
TOT	TALS \$	\$700	.00	<b>\$</b>	<del>_</del>		\$					
_	after such deter	ion of restitution is mination. must make restitut	_					`				ntered
_		t makes a partial pa er or percentage pa ed States is paid.	_		-							wise ii be paid
	e of Payee	•	<u>Total Loss*</u>			ution Ordered					rcenta	
									_	ee Cor	ntinuati	ion
тот	ALS	\$	\$	0.00	\$	\$0	.00			.50		
	Pactitution am	ount ordered purs	ant to plea agreen	nent \$								
Ш		-		_								
	fifteenth day a	must pay interest fifter the date of the r delinquency and	judgment, pursua	nt to 18 U.S	.C. § 3612(1							
П	The court dete	rmined that the de	fendant does not h	ave the abil	ity to pay in	terest and it is o	rdered that	:				
	the interes	st requirement is w	aived for the	fine [	restitutio	n.						
	_	st requirement for		restitu	tion is modi	fied as follows:						
		. 1		Cl	004 110 1	104 and 1124	- CT:41 - 10 A	C CC				- a <del>ta</del>

<sup>\*</sup> Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

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(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 6 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

TAREK MEHANNA	Judgment — Page	<u>5</u> of	10
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**DEFENDANT:** 

CASE NUMBER: 1: 09 CR 10017 - 001 - GAO

## **SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS**

Ha	aving assessed the defendant's ability to pa	pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties are due as follows:	
A	Lump sum payment of \$	due immediately, balance due	
	not later than in accordance C,	, or F below; or	
В	Payment to begin immediately (m	nay be combined with $\square$ C, $\square$ D, or $\square$ F below); or	
C	Payment in equal (e.g., months or year	(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ars), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of thi	over a period of is judgment; or
D		(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ars), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from i	
E	Payment during the term of supervimprisonment. The court will set	vised release will commence within (e.g., 30 or 60 days the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to p	) after release from ay at that time; or
F	Special instructions regarding the	payment of criminal monetary penalties:	
	The assessment fee is due forthw	with.	
Unl imp Res	nless the court has expressly ordered otherw prisonment. All criminal monetary pena esponsibility Program, are made to the cler	wise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetar alties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Pr rrk of the court.	ry penalties is due during isons' Inmate Financial
The	ne defendant shall receive credit for all pay	yments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties impose	ed.
	Joint and Several		See Continuation
	Defendant and Co-Defendant Names as and corresponding payee, if appropriate	and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint a te.	nd Several Amount,
	The defendant shall pay the cost of pro	osecution.	
Г	The defendant shall pay the following of	court cost(s):	
Ī	The defendant shall forfeit the defenda	ant's interest in the following property to the United States:	

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

AO 245B (Rev. 06/05) Criminal Judgment Attachment (Page 1) - Statement of Reasons - D. Massachusetts - 10/05 Judgment — Page 7 of 10 TAREK MEHANNA **DEFENDANT:** + CASE NUMBER: 1: 09 CR 10017 - 001 - GAO DISTRICT: **MASSACHUSETTS** STATEMENT OF REASONS COURT FINDINGS ON PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT I The court adopts the presentence investigation report without change. ┰ The court adopts the presentence investigation report with the following changes. (Check all that apply and specify court determination, findings, or comments, referencing paragraph numbers in the presentence report, if applicable.) (Use Section VIII if necessary.) 1 Chapter Two of the U.S.S.G. Manual determinations by court (including changes to base offense level, or specific offense characteristics): Chapter Three of the U.S.S.G. Manual determinations by court (including changes to victim-related adjustments, 2 role in the offense, obstruction of justice, multiple counts, or acceptance of responsibility): No adjustments under sec. 3A1.2 Chapter Four of the U.S.S.G. Manual determinations by court (including changes to criminal history category or 3 scores, career offender, or criminal livelihood determinations): 4 Additional Comments or Findings (including comments or factual findings concerning certain information in the presentence report that the Federal Bureau of Prisons may rely on when it makes inmate classification, designation, or programming decisions): C The record establishes no need for a presentence investigation report pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32. COURT FINDING ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE (Check all that apply.) II No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence. В Mandatory minimum sentence imposed. C One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum does not apply based on findings of fact in this case substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)) the statutory safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)) COURT DETERMINATION OF ADVISORY GUIDELINE RANGE (BEFORE DEPARTURES): Ш 47 Total Offense Level:

months

life

years

to life

to \$ 250,000 Fine waived or below the guideline range because of inability to pay.

Criminal History Category: Imprisonment Range:

Fine Range: \$ 25,000

Supervised Release Range: 2

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DEFENDANT: TAREK MEHANNA

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CASE NUMBER: 1: 09 CR 10017 - 001 - GAO

DISTRICT: MASSACHUSETTS

				ST	CATE	MENT OF REASONS			
IV	ADV	/ISOF	RY GUIDELINE SENTENCI	NG I	DETER	RMINATION (Check only one.)			
	Α [		The sentence is within an advisory g	uidel	ine range	that is not greater than 24 months, and	l the c	ourt finds	s no reason to depart.
	в [		The sentence is within an advisory g (Use Section VIII if necessary.)	uidel	ine range	that is greater than 24 months, and the	speci	fic senten	ce is imposed for these reasons.
	С [		The court departs from the advisory (Also complete Section V.)	guid	eline ran	ge for reasons authorized by the senten	cing g	uidelines	manual.
	D 🌡	Z	The court imposed a sentence outsid	e the	advisory	sentencing guideline system. (Also con	plete	Section V	I.)
V	DEP	ARTI	URES AUTHORIZED BY TH	IE A	DVISC	ORY SENTENCING GUIDELI	NES	(If appli	icable.)
	[	☐ be	entence imposed departs (Checklow the advisory guideline rangove the advisory guideline rangove the advisory guideline rangove the advisory guideline rangovers.)	ge	nly one.	):			
	В І	Depar	ture based on (Check all that a	pply	·.):				
	2		5K1.1 plea agreemer  5K3.1 plea agreemer  binding plea agreemer  plea agreement for d  plea agreement that s  Motion Not Addressed in  5K1.1 government m  5K3.1 government m  government motion for d  defense motion for d	nt bant frepar states  a Protionotion  for depar	sed on to sed on I for departure, who is that the lea Agi in based in based eparture ture to v	which the government did not obj	Progr le efens l chec sistar ck" p	e depart ck reason	
			_	epar	ture to v	which the government objected			
	3	3	Other  Other than a plea agr	eem	ent or n	notion by the parties for departure	(Che	eck reas	on(s) below.):
	С	Reas	on(s) for Departure (Check al	l tha	t apply (	other than 5K1.1 or 5K3.1.)			
	4A1.3 5H1.1 5H1.2 5H1.3 5H1.4 5H1.5 5H1.6 5H1.11	Crim Age Educ Men Phys Emp Fam Milii Good	cation and Vocational Skills tal and Emotional Condition tical Condition loyment Record ily Ties and Responsibilities tary Record, Charitable Service, d Works ravating or Mitigating Circumstances		5K2.1 5K2.2 5K2.3 5K2.4 5K2.5 5K2.6 5K2.7 5K2.8 5K2.9 5K2.10	Death Physical Injury Extreme Psychological Injury Abduction or Unlawful Restraint Property Damage or Loss Weapon or Dangerous Weapon Disruption of Government Function Extreme Conduct Criminal Purpose Victim's Conduct		5K2.12 5K2.13 5K2.14 5K2.16 5K2.17 5K2.18 5K2.20 5K2.21 5K2.22 5K2.23	Lesser Harm Coercion and Duress Diminished Capacity Public Welfare Voluntary Disclosure of Offense High-Capacity, Semiautomatic Weapon Violent Street Gang Aberrant Behavior Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct Age or Health of Sex Offenders Discharged Terms of Imprisonment aideline basis (e.g., 2B1.1 commentary)

D Explain the facts justifying the departure. (Use Section VIII if necessary.)

AO 245B ( 05-MA) (Rev. 06/05) Criminal Judgment
Attachment (Page 3) — Statement of Reasons - D. Massachusetts 10/05

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DEFENDANT: TAREK MEHANNA
CASE NUMBER: 1: 09 CR 10017 - 001 - GAO

DISTRICT: MASSACHUSETTS

713	11/1/		MASSACHUSETTS
			STATEMENT OF REASONS
/I		URT DET	TERMINATION FOR SENTENCE OUTSIDE THE ADVISORY GUIDELINE SYSTEM t apply.)
	A	<b>∠</b> below	tence imposed is (Check only one.):  v the advisory guideline range  e the advisory guideline range
	В	Sentence	e imposed pursuant to (Check all that apply.):
		1	Plea Agreement (Check all that apply and check reason(s) below.):  binding plea agreement for a sentence outside the advisory guideline system accepted by the court  plea agreement for a sentence outside the advisory guideline system, which the court finds to be reasonable  plea agreement that states that the government will not oppose a defense motion to the court to sentence outside the advisory guideline system
		2	Motion Not Addressed in a Plea Agreement (Check all that apply and check reason(s) below.):  government motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system  defense motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system to which the government did not object defense motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system to which the government objected
		3	Other  Other than a plea agreement or motion by the parties for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system (Check reason(s) below.):
	C	Reason(	s) for Sentence Outside the Advisory Guideline System (Check all that apply.)
		to refl to affe to pro to pro (18 U	ture and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) lect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)) ord adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)) steet the public from further crimes of the defendant (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)) ovide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner over a substantial disparities among defendants (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)) ovide restitution to any victims of the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7))
	D	Explain	the facts justifying a sentence outside the advisory guideline system. (UseSection VIII if necessary.)

See statement of reasons made on the record in open court, a transcript of which is attached and is incorporated herein.

TAREK MEHANNA **DEFENDANT:** 

CASE NUMBER: 1: 09 CR 10017 - 001 - GAO

DISTRICT:

**MASSACHUSETTS** 

#### STATEMENT OF DEASONS

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VII	CO	UKT	DET	TERMINATIONS OF RESTITUTION	
	A	<b>₹</b>	Res	estitution Not Applicable.	
	В	Tota	ıl Am	mount of Restitution:	
	C	Rest	itutio	tion not ordered (Check only one.):	
		1		For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is not c identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(A).	
		2		For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is not consistent issues of fact and relating them to the cause or amount of the victims' losses would complicate or probability that the need to provide restitution to any victim would be outweighed by the burden on the sentencing	ong the sentencing process to a degree
		3		For other offenses for which restitution is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 and/or required by the se ordered because the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the fashion the need to provide restitution to any victims under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii).	,
		4		Restitution is not ordered for other reasons. (Explain.)	
VIII	D <b>ADI</b>	DITIO		AL FACTS JUSTIFYING THE SENTENCE IN THIS CASE (If applicable.)	
VIII		_	ONA)	AL FACTS JUSTIFYING THE SENTENCE IN THIS CASE (If applicable.)	n all felony cases.
	ADI	— DITIO	Se Se	AL FACTS JUSTIFYING THE SENTENCE IN THIS CASE (If applicable.)  Sections I, II, III, IV, and VII of the Statement of Reasons form must be completed in	•
Defei	ADI	DITIO	Sec. Sec	Sections I, II, III, IV, and VII of the Statement of Reasons form must be completed in the complete of the com	•
Defei Defei	<b>ADI</b> ndant	DITIO	Sec. Sec	Sections I, II, III, IV, and VII of the Statement of Reasons form must be completed in ec. No.:    Output	•
Defei Defei	<b>ADI</b> ndant	DITIO	Sec. Sec	Sections I, II, III, IV, and VII of the Statement of Reasons form must be completed in ec. No.:    Output	A. O'Toole Judge, U.S. District Cour

#### STATEMENT OF REASONS (FROM TRANSCRIPT)

THE COURT: The sentencing statute, Section 3553(a) of Title 18, sets forth a number of specific categorical factors to be considered by a court in devising an appropriate sentence. The weight given to any particular factor varies from case to case based on the particular facts and context of the case at hand. It is not uncommon that the factors sometimes might point in different directions, and it is an accommodation, or the balance of the several factors, that ultimately should support the judgment that is made. So let me

address the factors in some detail.

Two of the factors are the nature and circumstances of the offense and the need to provide for just punishment of that offense. The defendant was convicted after trial of providing and attempting and conspiring to provide material support to al Qa'ida, support that he intended to have the effect of advancing al Qa'ida's murderous operations in Iraq and elsewhere. He was convicted of conspiring with others to join in training camps in the hope of actually engaging in fighting himself. He was also convicted of conspiring with others both in person and through the internet to perform services, including translation and dissemination services, in support of

al Qa'ida. The proof came some through witnesses, but much of it consisted of the defendant's own words in chats and emails and recordings.

The trip to Yemen for the defendant in the end proved to be a more or less feckless attempt, though it was no less a serious attempt for its failure. It was an attempt, the result of a conspiracy, to join in an armed struggle against American forces and American nationals. It is long settled in our law that conspiracy and attempt are punishable by substantial penalties even in the event of their failure to succeed.

Later the defendant found a more suitable and congenial role: He could provide material support to al Qa'ida by proselytizing and translating, knowingly and intentionally, according to the evidence, aiding the media wing of al Qa'ida, As-Sahab, and others in promoting violent jihad and recruiting young Muslim men of the English-speaking West to active participation in that jihad. He was effective in those efforts both at a micro and at a macro level.

At the micro level he was a charismatic leader, as I think we have seen this morning, of a small group of Massachusetts men who, with him, were drawn into radical Salafist jihadi theology and ideology, such as Massoud, Abu Bakr, Maldonado, Spaulding, Abu Zahra, and even Abousamra. Among other things, including his strong and magnetic personality and his native intelligence, the defendant's

serious religious scholarship made him a kind of leader in that group, and they looked to him for leadership and guidance and he encouraged them to radical action.

At the macro level he was a respected voice in web forums, chat rooms, one-on-one messaging. He was an active participant in the radical at-Tibyan forum and was, from the evidence at trial, including posts from that forum -- he was accorded a degree of respect from the other participants.

It is true he eventually was "kicked off," I think as Mr. Carney put it at trial, the forum because his views were not as extreme as others, but extremity is a relative term and it would be hard to characterize the defendant's views as moderate simply because they weren't at the outer edge of extremity. The debate was -- or at least the one that was highlighted at trial -- was exactly who it was permitted to kill in the execution of jihad. And the defendant expressed concern about violence to those whom he regarded as truly innocent, but it was also plain that he had no qualms about the killing by explosive device or by beheading of persons whom he regarded as supporting U.S. military action in Muslim countries, including non-military personnel who were in support.

He translated important propaganda works including, of course, the "39 Ways" and the "Expedition of Umar Hadeed," which celebrated and encouraged suicide bombers, and as a

consequence he was sought out on occasion by al Qa'ida in Iraq as a translator for other works, including one by as important a figure as Ayman al-Zawahiri. That he was sought out in this way even though in that instance he did not undertake the work, showed that at least some in al Qa'ida valued the support that he was able to give.

It was possible, even appropriate, a few months ago to wonder whether the defendant could be guilty of the crimes he was charged with, but the jury has answered that question, and that verdict necessarily implies the rejection of the defendant's argument made at trial that his activity was limited to protected speech or independent advocacy. To think otherwise, one would have to disregard a great deal of the actual trial evidence. So that's a summary of the criminal acts that support the verdicts in the case, and those acts warrant a substantial criminal sanction as a penalty.

Another factor in the statute is the need to promote respect for the law. This is a consideration that looks in two directions. On the one hand, the sentence must be one that satisfies the wider community that the law has been vindicated by the sentence imposed; that is, that the punishment fits the crime and is imposed in an appropriate and proportionate way to the seriousness of the offense. This satisfies the community's legitimate interest in a retributive punishment.

On the other hand, the sentence must also promote

respect for the law in the sense that it serves as a warning to those who might be tempted to commit similar offenses, that their criminal acts will be punished appropriately as well.

And this serves as an instrument of deterrence of future criminal conduct. Both of these interests are also significant in this case.

Another factor in the statute is the history and characteristics of the defendant. This can often be a confounding factor. In many ways, many genuine ways, the defendant has behaved as an exemplary citizen, as the many letters submitted in his support attest. I credit the facts and opinions expressed in those letters, as far as they go. Even the evidence in the case showed the defendant to be an intensely serious young man interested sincerely in how he should form his life and conduct to please God and to exemplify Islamic life properly lived. That itself is noble and praiseworthy.

He became, however, consumed with a religious enthusiasm that was at once partly admirable and partly horrifying. And as to the events at issue in this case, the horrifying part came to dominance and it led him to willful participation in the conspiracies and attempts, of which he stands convicted.

Many of the letter-writers have noted how difficult it is for them to believe that the Tarek Mehanna that they knew

could simultaneously be the Tarek Mehanna described in the indictment and, it must be said, substantiated in the trial evidence.

The sad fact is that it is not an uncommon phenomenon. One might call it the Jekyll-and-Hyde phenomenon. It is a reality of human nature that we all have capacities for both good and evil, and we all do acts both good and evil in various proportions in the course of our lives. And the good and evil impulses and acts sometimes occur simultaneously with each other. In sentencing we see this phenomenon, as I say, commonly. You might be surprised how frequently people convicted of serious crimes are shown to have lived, in other respects, lives of probity and charity. Just as two wrongs don't make a right, two rights don't excuse a wrong, and the wrong still must be punished. Still, the punishment must be appropriate specifically to this defendant and it should take account of who he is, fully considered.

A related consideration mandated by the statute is the need to protect the public from future crimes by the defendant. One object of criminal punishment is simply to incapacitate a defendant from committing another offense by reason of incarceration. That is typically an immediate or near-term objective effective during the term of incarceration. Another object of punishment for the longer term is to deter the punished defendant from repeating his offense. This could

occur by effecting a change of heart or by inducing a practical and self-interested calculation. In either event, the sentence should be sufficient to promote, optimally bring about, a commitment in the defendant not to reoffend. Both considerations apply here.

I am, frankly, concerned by the defendant's apparent absence of remorse notwithstanding the jury verdict. His position in this respect has, as I think we have seen this morning, a quality of defiance. As a consequence, this factor has significant prominence in the overall assessment of an appropriate punishment.

Two other related and important statutory factors affecting sentencing are the advice of the Sentencing Guidelines and the need of a sentence to avoid creating unwarranted disparities with other similarly situated cases. The statute requires the Court to consider the advice that emerges from the Sentencing Guidelines as to appropriate sentencing ranges, and it requires the Court to consider the need to avoid unwarranted disparity for similarly situated defendants.

These two requirements work in harmony. A principal purpose of the Guidelines has always been to provide judges with a common rubric and framework for deciding on an appropriate sentence, and by that commonality to try to reduce disparity in judgments from one judge to another and one

defendant to another. And in general terms, adhering to Guidelines' recommendations tends to have that effect.

Nevertheless, the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, and a sentencing judge is ultimately responsible for imposing a just sentence in the particular case at hand, and that ultimate goal is not to yield to an uncritical adherence to the Guidelines' recommendation.

Some Guidelines provisions, such as the drug offense guidelines, are frequently consulted. And as a result, there is a large body of decisions involving their application.

Where there has been such wide experience with guideline provisions, there is an opportunity to assess how well those provisions serve all the relevant sentencing factors, including the reduction of disparity in sentencing. And as has recently occurred with the drug guidelines, that experience can lead to a revision of the Guidelines to improve the match between their intention and their effect. The Guidelines at issue in this case have not had a similar frequency of application and, consequently, our collective experience with them is much more limited.

At least from the perspective of this case to which my attention has been directed, I do not think the Guidelines applied in accordance with their terms do an adequately reliable job in balancing the relevant sentencing factor for several reasons: First, the terrorism adjustments that we

referred to when we set the Guidelines range operate in a way that is too general to be convincingly reliable in a given case. Both the 12-level adjustment to the offense level and the automatic assignment of a Criminal History Category VI which are applied in any case that can be fairly characterized as a terrorism case, regardless of the particular facts, not only make the recommendation unuseful as a guide in a particular case but is actually, in my view, contrary to and subversive of the mission of the Guidelines which is to address with some particularity the unique facts of the given case. And gross adjustments such as the ones I've referenced do not do that.

Moreover, the automatic assignment of a defendant to a Criminal History Category VI is not only too blunt an instrument to have genuine analytical value, it is fundamentally at odds with the design of the Guidelines. It can, as it does in this case, import a fiction into the calculus. It would impute to a defendant who has had no criminal history a fictional history of the highest level of seriousness. It's one thing to adjust the offense level upward to signify the seriousness of the offense. It is entirely another to say that a defendant has a history of criminal activity that he does not, in fact, have.

Contrast this situation with the career offender guideline which makes a somewhat similar adjustment. But in

that instance the Guidelines make an adjustment to a defendant's criminal history score precisely because he has a certain criminal history. The adjustment to criminal history called for by Section 3A1.4(b) is, I believe, simply a way of "cooking the books" to get to a score and a desired sentencing range, at least as it is applied in the context of this case. So I find the Guidelines literally taken, because of those problems and perhaps a few others, not to be reliable advice.

Another way of assessing the usefulness of Guidelines advice is to look at how they have been actually applied, a kind of judicial biofeedback. A survey of cases involving convictions under the same statutes that are involved in this case indicates that courts have frequently varied downward by significant degrees from the range recommended by these Guidelines.

I asked our probation officer to obtain some statistical data from the Sentencing Commission regarding recent sentences under Sections 2339A and 2339B and 956, the key statutes involved here. The data she obtained is for fiscal years 2009 through 2011. It is a small sample and may not be statistically reliable. I don't use it for that purpose but for illustrative purposes.

In that period, that three-year period, offenders convicted under 2339B received non-government-sponsored below-range sentences slightly more than half the time. For

convictions under 2339A that figure rose to just above two-thirds. In cases involving both statutes there are only seven cases, and six of the seven received non-government-sponsored below-range sentences. Five offenders were convicted in that period under both 2339A and 956, and four of the five received non-government-sponsored below-range sentences.

As I say, these figures are, admittedly, a non-rigorous analysis, but they do suggest that judges faced with sentencing decisions in individual cases have not found the Guidelines range helpful in establishing the appropriate sentence. And, of course, in this case, even the government's recommended sentence is below the calculated guideline range and is, I guess, implicitly, a government-sponsored below-range recommendation.

All that said, the guidelines at issue are not wholly without some advisory value. If the principal defects, as I've found them, are omitted from the calculation, leaving in place the respective base offense levels and more common adjustments, such as role in the offense or obstruction of justice, one can hypothesize a calculation that tends to correct for what I find to be the defects in the Guidelines as they are written and strictly applied.

Without going through the details, because this is a hypothesis and not a strict application, leaving out the

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terrorist adjustment to the offense level and the postulation of a criminal history of Category VI, the offense level under Count 1 would be 30; under Counts 2 through 4, 35; and under Counts 5 through 7, 14. Under the grouping rules, which are uncontroversial, the highest level, 35 for Counts 2 through 4, would be used, and that is appropriate in this case because those represent the gravamen of the prosecution.

Using a true criminal history category of I with a Level 35 produces a suggested guideline range -- and this is hypothetical, I repeat -- of 168 to 210 months. That range is generally in line with what the Sentencing Commission statistics indicate. For the same period, 2009 to 2011, the average sentence imposed on convictions under 2339B was 179 and a half months and the median was 135. For convictions under 2339A the average sentence was 164.7 months and the median was 144. For convictions under both sections the average was 171.5, and the median 112.5. The numbers are substantially higher when a conviction under 956 is involved, as it is here, although, again, the sample size is very small for these cases. For convictions under 956 alone -- and there are a total of 12 in the relevant period -- the average sentence was 276.3 months, and the median 222. For the five convictions under both 2339A and 956, which is also the case here, the average sentence was 242 and a half months and the median was 204.

Now, I've used a lot of numbers, and I don't mean this

to be a mathematical computation. My point is simply to try to consult those non-guidelines Guidelines that might help make a decision about an appropriate sentence, having in mind what is legitimate, in my view, about the guidelines and, two, the need to avoid unwanted disparities across cases. I should add, of course, that none of this comparison addresses the particular facts of any of the cases; this is simply outcomes only. But in sum, when the features of the relevant guidelines here that I find to be defective are removed from the calculation, the resulting range is substantially consistent with what judges seem to have been actually doing in cases involving charges under the same statutes.

Now, proposing that hypothetical or "ghost" guideline, as I say, yields a suggested range, if we can even call it that, of 168 to 210. In coming to that conclusion, I have made two major judgments, disregarding parts of the guidelines as written, that have been favorable to the defendant.

Taking consideration of all the factors in 3553(a), including, in particular, the need for just punishment for the offense, the need to protect the public from future offenses by the defendant, and the need to avoid unwanted disparity, I think it is appropriate to impose a sentence at the upper end of that range, hypothetical range, of 210 months.